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I 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-519 
WILLIAM C. RANDALL, ROGER E. AUSTIN, TOM W. 
ANDERSON AND MYREL A. NEUMANN, PETI-
TIONERS v. B. J. LOFTSGAARDEN ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1986] 
JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is ~er the recovery available 
to a defrauded tax shelter investor, entitled under § 12(2) of 
the Securities Act of 1933 or § 10(b) of the Securities Act of 
1934 to rescind the fraudulent transaction or obtain re-
scissio~mages, must be reduced by ani tax benefits 
the mvestornas received-from the tax s elter inv~t. 
- --I 
In 1973, petitioners purchased interests in Alotel Asso-
ciates (Associates), a limited partnership organized by re-
spondent B. J. Loftsgaarden to build and operate a motel in 
Rochester, Minnesota. Loftsgaarden was the president and 
sole shareholder of respondent Alotel, Inc. (Alotel), which, 
together with Loftsgaarden, was to be a general partner in 
the venture. 
Loftsgaarden marketed this $3.5 million project as a "tax 
shelter," which would result in" 'significantly greater returns 
for persons in relatively high income tax brackets."' Austin 
v. Loftsgaarden (Austin 1), 675 F. 2d 168, 173 (CA8 1982). 
As a partnership, Associates would not be taxed as an entity. 
Rather, its taxable income and losses would pass through to 
the limited partners, who would then be entitled to claim 




to the extent of their adjusted basis in their partnership in-
terests. 26 U. S. C. § 704(d). Especially attractive from 
the high-income investor's perspective was the fact that "in a 
real estate investment such as the one contemplated by 
Loftsgaarden, the limited partner's basis is not restricted to 
the amount of his actual investment (the amount 'at risk'); 
rather, it may be increased by the partner's proportional 
share of any nonrecourse loans made to the partnership." 
675 F. 2d, at 173. See 26 U.S. C. §465(c)(3)(D). Conse-
quently, the individual limited partner may be able to claim 
deductible partnership losses in amounts greatly in excess of 
the funds invested, and offset those losses against other 
income. 
The initial offering memorandum indicated that Associates 
would employ financing techniques designed to provide large 
and immediate tax savings to the limited partners: a nonre-
course loan would finance the bulk of the project, and rapid 
depreciation methods would be used to throw off large initial 
losses. Nonetheless, the initial offering was unsuccessful, 
and Loftsgaarden revised the plan and the offering memo-
randum to propose that Associates would rent land instead of 
purchasing it, thereby incurring another deductible expense. 
Petitioners subscribed to the second offering, investing from 
$35,000 to $52,000 each. Associates soon began to experi-
ence financial difficulties, and in February 1975 Loftsgaarden 
asked the limited partners to make additional loans to Asso-
ciates; they complied, but initiated an investigation into the 
partnership. Associates eventually defaulted on its ob-
ligations, and in 1978 the motel was foreclosed on by its 
creditors. 
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court in 1976, 
alleging securities fraud and raising federal claims under 
§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2), 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5, as well as 




had knowingly made material misrepresentations and omis-
sions in the revised offering memorandum, and that petition-
ers had reasonably relied on these material misstatements, 
which caused their damages. AJpong other misstatements, 
respondents had mischaracterized the financing available, 
the terms of the land lease, and the manner and extent of 
their compensation for services rendered. These findings 
made respondents liable under§ 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and state 
law. The District Court also accepted the jury's advisory 
verdict that respondents were liable under § 12(2) for know-
ingly making material misrepresentations and omissions in 
the offering memorandum which induced their purchases. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. E-1. 
Finding that petitioners' investments were worthless by 
the time they discovered the fraud in 1975, the District Court 
held that the remedy of rescission was proper under § 12(2), 
which provides that an investor harmed by prospectus fraud 
may sue "to recover the consideration paid for such security 
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received 
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if 
he no longer owns the security." 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2). Re-
scission was permissible, the court ruled, notwithstanding 
that petitioners had not made a tender of their securities to 
respondents until shortly before trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 
E-15. Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment for 
petitioners in the amount of the consideration paid for the 
limited partnership units, together with prejudgment inter-
est; it also noted that each of the counts found by the jury 
would independently support respondents' liability, but that 
"each plaintiff is entitled only to a single recovery." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. E-16. The District Court rejected respond-
ents' contention that petitioners' recovery should be offset by 
tax benefits received, concluding that "[a]bsent [respond-
ents'] fraud, which induced their purchases, [petitioners] 
would probably have made other investments which pro-
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duced temporary ta savings, but without the total loss of 
their investme ." App. to Pet. for Cert. F-9--F-10. 
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sus-
tained respondents' liability under § 12(2) and § 10(b), but 
reversed the rescissionary award and remanded for a new 
trial on that issue. The panel rejected respondents' claim 
that petitioners were not entitled to rescission under § 12(2) 
because they had made no tender of their partnership inter-
ests until shortly before trial, 675 F. 2d, at 179, agreeing with 
the District Court's "decision to apply what was essentially a 
rescissory measure of damages in this case." !d., at 181. 
The panel held, however, that the District Court had erred in 
refusing to reduce "the damage award" by an amount equal 
to any tax benefits received by petitioners "on account of the 
investment." Ibid. 
In the panel's view, an "actual damages principle," appli-
cable both to § 12(2) and § 10(b), required that an award of 
rescission or of rescissionary damages be "'red~ceQ. by any 
value ~iY...ed as a result of the fraudulent Tran~:tion.'" 
!d., at 181 (quoting Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F. 
2d 1357, 1361 (CAS 1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 951 (1978)). 
The panel observed that the benefits anticipated from a suc-
cessful real estate tax shelter typically include tax savings to 
the limited partner in the early years, followed by income in 
later years, and reasoned that "unlike a corporate share-
holder, ... even if the enterprise fails to become profitable, 
the limited partner clearly may have something of value be-
cause of the investment's unique tax treatment." I d., at 
182. In light of "the value of the tax deductions generated 
by such an investment," the panel held that "the strictly com-
pensatory nature of damages awardable in private securities 
fraud actions requires that such value be taken into account 
in determining whether and to what extent damages were in-
flicted upon plaintiffs." I d., at 183. Finally, the panel 
rejected petitioners' objection that "because there are tax 
consequences to any investment one makes, evidence of those 
85-519-0PINION 
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consequences will now figure in every securities fraud case," 
and asserted that its holding was limited to "cases involving 
investments that are expressly marketed and sold as tax 
shelters." Ibid. / 
On remand, the "f>istrict Court held a bench trial on the 
issue of tax benefits, and calculated each petitioner's dam-
ages as the purchase price of his partnership interest plus 
simple interest, minus net tax benefits. App. to Pet. for 
Cert. C-5. Both petitioners and respondents appealed from 
the District Court's judgment, and, after a second panel 
ruled on various subsidiary issues, the Court of Appeals 
reconsidered the case en bane. Austin v. Loftsgaarden 
(Austin 11), 768 F. 2d 949 (CA8 1985). 
\ 
Relying in part on the law of the case, and noting that the 
Second Circuit had reached a similar result in Salcer v. 
Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F. 2d 935 (1984), cert.pending, 
No. 84-1447, the Court of Appeals adhered to the Austin I 
panel's holding that an award of rescission or of rescissionary 
damages to a defrauded tax shelter investor should be re-
duced by any tax benefits actually received. This offset, 
moreover, was required whether the award stemmed from li-
ability under§ 10(b) or§ 12(2). 768 F. 2d, at 953-954. As to 
§ 10(b), the Court of Appeals relied on § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 
which provides that "no person permitted to maintain a suit 
for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall 
recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more 
actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on 
account of the act complained of." 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a). 
As to § 12(2), the court acknowledged that "the words 'actual 
damages' do not appear in the 1933 Act," but suggested that 
the rescission remedy provided by section 12(2) had been, 
and should be, construed as 
"substantially equivalent to the damages permitted 
under section 28(a). Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States, 406 U. S. 128, 155 (1972). The goal of 




the status quo ante, 'and hence a plaintiff can recover no 
more than his or her net economic loss, i. e., actual dam-
ages.'" 768 F. 2d, at 954 (quoting Salcer, supra, at 
940). 
Although the Court of Appeals recognized that "tax benefits 
are not a form of income in a strict accounting sense," 768 F. 
2d, at 955, it nonetheless concluded, in light of its interpreta-
tion of§ 28(a) and of the purposes of the rescission remedy, 
that t~aben fits are "income received" within the meaning of 
§ 12(2). 8 F. 2d, at 954-955. 
The ourt of Appeals then proceeded to engage in a de-
tailed analysis of the manner in which petitioners' 
rescissionary damages should be determined. The court 
ruled that prejudgment interest should not have been based 
on the total consideration paid by each petitioner, but rather 
on the amount by which each was "'out-of-pocket' during 
each year of the investment." 768 F. 2d, at 958. The court 
then determined that under its theory the tax consequences 
flowing from petitioners' recovery of damages, as well as the 
tax benefits themselves, should be taken into account in 
determining damages. Accordingly, it doubled the total 
damages award, including prejudgment interest, to reflect 
the fact that each petitioner was in the 50% income tax 
bracket. 768 F. 2d, at 960-961. The combined effect of the 
Austin II court's several rulings was this: under the 
rescissionary approach originally employed by the District 
Court, petitioners would have been entitled to total recover-
ies ranging from $64,610 to $96,385, App. to Pet. for Cert. 
B-1-B-2; under the Court of Appeals' final ruling, petition-
ers could recover only amounts ranging from $506 to $7,666. 
768 F. 2d, at 961. 
Two judges dissented from the Court of Appeals' adher-
ence to the panel's holding in Austin I. In their view, tax 
benefits could not plausibly be viewed as "income received" 
within the meaning of§ 12(2), and the effect of allowing a tax 




the fraudulent party." 768 F. 2d, at 963 (Lay, C. J., dissent-
ing). We granted certiorari because of the question's impor-
tance to the administration of the federal tax and securities 
laws, and because the Courts of Appeals are divided in their 
treatment of tax benefits for purposes of calculating damages 
in federal securities fraud litigation. See Burgess v. Pre-
mier Corp., 727 F. 2d 826, 838 (CA91984) (refusing to reduce 
damages by taXisl~efits received in an action under § lO(b)). 
We now reverse. 
II 
Section 12(2) specifies the conduct that gives rise to liabil-
ity for prospectus fraud and expressly creates a private right 
of action in favor of the defrauded investor, who "may sue 
either at law or in equity in any court of competent juris-
diction, to recover the consideration paid for such security 
with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received 
thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if 
he no longer owns the security." 15 U. S. C. § 77l(2). 
Thus, § 12(2) prescribes the remedy of rescission except 
where the plaintiff no longer owns the security. See Wigand 
v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F. 2d 1028, 1035 (CA2 1979). Even in 
the latter situation, we may assume that a rescissionary 
measure of damages will be employed; the plaintiff is entitled 
to a return of the consideration paid, reduced by the amount 
realized when he sold the security and by any "income re-
ceived" on the security. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 
1st Sess. 9 (1933) (under § 12, the buyer can "sue for recovery 
of his purchase price, or for damages not exceeding such 
price"); L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1020 
(1983) (hereinafter Loss) ("when the plaintiff in § 12 no longer 
owns the security, damages are to be measured so as to re-
sult in the substantial equivalent of rescission"). 
Petitioners contend that § 12(2)'s "income received" lan-
guage clearly excludes tax benefits received pursuant to a 
tax shelter investment because tax benefits are not "a form of 




955 (footnote omitted), and are not taxed as such. Accord-
ingly, petitioners argue that tax benefits cannot offset a 
rescissionary award under § 12(2). 
Here, as in oth~r contexts, the starting point in construing 
a statute is the language of the statute itself. E . g., Santa 
Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 477 (1977). 
Moreover, "if the language of a provision of the securities 
laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with 
the legislative history, it is unnecessary 'to examine the addi-
tional considerations of "policy" ... that may have influenced 
the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.'" Aaron 
v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 695 (1980) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 214, n. 33 (1976). Section 12(2), 
we think, speaks with the clarity necessary to invoke this 
"plain language" canon: § 12(2)'s offset for "income received" 
on the security does not encompass the tax benefits received 
by defrauded investors by virtue of their ownership of the se-
curity, because such benefits cannot, under any reasonable 
definition, be termed "income." 
The tax benefits attributable to ownership of a security ini-
tially take the form of tax deductions or tax credits. These 
have no value in themselves; the economic benefit to the in-
vestor-the true "tax benefit"-arises because the investor 
may offset tax deductions against income received from other 
sources or use tax credits to reduce the taxes otherwise pay-
able on account of such income. Unlike payments in cash or 
property received by virtue of ownership of a security-such 
as distributions or dividends on stock, interest on bonds, or a 
limited partner's distributive share of the partnership's capi-
tal gains or profits-the "receipt" of tax deductions or credits 
is not itself a taxable event, for the investor has received no 
money or other "income" within the meaning of the Internal 
Revenue Code. See 26 U. S. C. § 61. Thus, we would re-
quire compelling evidence before imputing to Congress an in-
tent to describe the tax benefits an investor derives from tax 
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deductions or credits attributable to ownership of a security 
as "income received thereo.rV" 
This Court's decision in rJnited Housing Foundatio'fl,, Inc. 
v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975), lends additional su port to 
our conclusion that the economic value of tax deduct ons and 
tax credits in the hands of a particular investor is not "income 
received" on a security for purposes of § 12(2). In orman, 
the Court rejected a claim that shares in certain housing 
projects must be deemed to be "securities" because f "the 
deductibility for tax purposes of the portion of the m ~thly 
rental charge applied to interest on the mortgage," which 
was said to constitute "an expectation of 'income."' Id., at 
854-855. To the contrary, the Court found "no basis in law 
for the view that the payment of interest, with its consequent 
deductibility for tax purposes, constitutes income or profits." 
I d., at 855. In this case, we reject the analogous suggestion 
that the tax deductions petitioners were entitled to take by 
virtue of their partnership interests "constitut[e] income or 
profits." I d., at 855. 
Respondents have produced no specific evidence from the 
sparse legislative history of§ 12(2) to establish that Congress 
intended tax benefits to be treated as "income received." 
Instead, respondents urge that we look to the nature of the 
equitable remedy of rescission, which they say is exclusively 
"an effort to restore the status quo ante." Brief for Re-
spondents 27. Under this interpretation of rescission, re-
spondents maintain, "any person demanding the rescission of 
a contract to which he is a party must restore or offer to 
restore to the other party whatever he may have received 
under the contract in the way of money, property, or other 
consideration or benefit." Ibid. (quoting 2 H. Black, Black 
on Rescission and Cancellation § 617, at p. 1417 (1916)). Pe-
titioners' tax benefits, respondents argue, constitute such 
"consideration or benefit." 
Generalities such as these-which come to us unsupported 





benefits as consideration or property that must be returned 
or offset against the plaintiff's recovery in rescission-fall far 
short of the showing required to overcome the plain language 
of§ 12(2). Moreover, even at common law, it is quite likely 
that tax benefits would be ignored for purposes of a re-
scissionary remedy. Under the "direct product" rule, the 
party seeking rescission was required to credit the party 
against whom rescission was sought only with gains that 
were the "direct product" of the property the plaintiff had 
acquired under the transaction to be rescinded: "The phrase 
'direct product' means that which is derived from the owner-
ship or possession of the property without the intervention of 
an independent transacti€1n by the possessor." Restatement 
of Restitution § 157 comment b (1937). We agree with 
amici, the United States and the SEC, that tax benefits, 
because they accrue only if the tax deductions or credits the 
investment throws off are combined with income genera:ted 
by the investor or taxes owed on such income, would in all 
likelihood not have been deemed a "direct product" of the se-
curity at common law. See Brief for the United States ~nd 
the SEC 13. Cf. Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall, 147 N. E. 
2d 383 (Ill. App.), aff'd, 155 N. E. 2d 14 (1958) (refusing to 
reduce damages for an accountant's negligence in discovering 
an embezzlement of plaintiff by the amount of the tax bene-
fits plaintiff received by virtue of the theft). Respondents 
offer no reason to think that in enacting § 12(2) Congress in-
tended to curtail the investor's recovery by relaxing the limit 
on offsets imposed by the "direct product" rule. 
Respondents' view of the purposes served by § 12(2)'s re-
scission remedy is likewise flawed. Certainly a restoration 
of the plaintiff to his position prior to the fraud is one goal 
that will generally be served by § 12(2), as by common law 
rescission or restitution. But the 1933 Act is intended to do 
more than ensure that defrauded investors will be compen-
sated: the Act also "aim[s] ... to prevent further exploita-
tion of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and 
85-519-0PINION 
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worthless securities through misrepresentation [and] to place 
adequate and true information before the investor." S. Rep. 
No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). See also United 
States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 775-776 (1979). We may 
therefore infer that Congress chose a rescissionary remedy 
when it enacted § 12(2) in order to deter prospectus fraud and 
encourage full disclosure as well as to make investors whole. 
Indeed, by enabling the victims of prospectus fraud to de-
mand rescission upon tender of the security, Congress shifted 
the risk of an intervening decline in the value of the security 
to defendants, whether or not that decline was actually 
caused by the fraud. See Thompson, The Measure of Recov-
ery Under Rule lOb--5: A Restitution Alternative To Tort 
Damages, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 349, 369 (1984) (hereinafter 
Thompson); Loss, supra, at 1133. Thus, rescission adds an 
additional measure of deterrence as compared to a purely 
compensatory measure of damages. 
We also reject, as did the Court of Appeals, 768 F. 2d, at 
958, respondents' alternative contention that tax benefits 
constitute "a return of, or a reduction in, 'consideration.'" 
Brief for Respondents 29-30. There is no indication that 
Congress intended the word "consideration" in § 12(2) to 
mean anything other than what the context would suggest-
the money or property given by the investor in exchange for 
the security. And, in view of the express offset for "income 
received," we think any implicit offset for a return of con-
sideration must be confined to the clear case in which such 
money or property is returned to the investor. Here, the 
consideration given by petitioners in exchange for their part-
nership interests took the form of money, not tax deductions, 
and the fact that petitioners' received tax deductions from 
which they were able to derive tax benefits therefore cannot 
constitute a return of that consideration. Accordingly, we 
hold that § 12(2) does not authorize an offset of tax benefits 
received by a defrauded investor against the investor's 
rescissionary recovery, either as "income received" or as a 
85-519-0PINION 
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return of "consideration," and that this is so whether or not 
the security in question is classified as a tax shelter. 
III 
We now consider whether § 28(a) should alter our conclu-
sion that § 12(2) does not authorize a reduction in the plain-
tiff's recovery in the amount of tax benefits received, and 
whether § 28(a) requires such an offset when a rescissionary 
measure of damages is applied to a plaintiff's § 10(b) claim. 
Respondents suggest that § 12(2) and § 28 should be con-
strued in pari materia, arguing that the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined that § 28(a) stands for a broad principle 
that recovery under the federal securities laws is strictly lim-
ited to the defrauded investor's "actual damages," and hence 
that anything of economic value received by the victim of 
fraud as a result of the investment must be used to reduce 
the victim's recovery. This principle, they say, requires us 
to construe § 12(2)'s express offset for "income received" on 
the security as encompassing any tax benefits received by 
petitioners. 
The Court of Appeals relied on Globus v. Law Research 
Service, Inc., 418 F. 2d 1276 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U. S. 913 (1970), which read § 17(a) of the 1933 Act in pari 
materia with § 28(a) insofar as the latter provision is deemed 
to bar punitive damages. See 768 F. 2d, at 954. Assuming 
arguendo that Globus was correctly decided, it is clearly 
distinguishable, for any private right of action under § 17(a) 
would be an implied one, and § 17(a) makes no reference to 
damages, whether punitive or compensatory. See id., at 
1283-1284. By contrast, Congress addressed the matter of 
prospectus fraud with considerable specificity in § 12(2), 
which not only antedates § 28(a), but was also left untouched 
by Congress when it passed the 1934 Act. See Loss, supra, 
at 1024. We therefore decline to read § 28(a) as mandating a 
limit on the rescission remedy created by Congress in the 
1933 Act by enactment of § 12(2). To hold otherwise would 
85-519-0PINION 
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be to effect a partial repeal of § 12(2) by implication, and "[i]t 
is, of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction 
that repeals by implication are not favored." Radzanower v. 
Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 154 (1976) (quoting 
United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U. S. 
164, 168 (1976). There is no "irreconcilable conflict" here 
between the two Acts, nor is this a case in which "the later 
act covers the whole situation of the earlier one and is clearly 
intended as a substitute." Id., at 154, quoting Posadas v. 
National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936). Cf. Herman 
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 384 (1983) (adopt-
ing a "cumulative construction of the remedies under the 
1933 and 1934 Acts"). 
The issue whether and under what circumstances rescis-
sion or a rescissionary measure of damages is available under 
§ 10(b) is an unsettled one. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. 
United States, 406 U. S. 128, 155 (1972), which involved vi-
olations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by a buyer of securities, 
this Court held that ordinarily "the correct measure of dam-
ages under § 28 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), is the differ-
ence between the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received 
and the fair value of what he would have received had there 
been no fraudulent conduct." Courts have also generally ap-
plied this "out-of-pocket" measure of damages in§ 10(b) cases 
involving fraud by a seller of securities, see, e. g., Harris v. 
American Investment Co., 523 F. 2d 220, 225 (CA8 1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U. S. 1054 (1976); Thompson, supra, at 365. 
But there is authority for allowing the § 10(b) plaintiff, at 
least in some circumstances, to choose between "undoing the 
bargain (when events since the transaction have not made re-
scission impossible) or holding the defendant to the bargain 
by requiring him to pay [out-of-pocket] damages." Loss, 
supra, at 1133. See, e. g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F. 2d 
891, 909 (CA9 1975) ("[w]hile out of pocket loss is the ordi-
nary standard in a 10b-5 suit, it is within the discretion of the 
85-519---0PINION 
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district judge in appropriate circumstances to apply a rescis-
sory measure"). 
Respondents do not dispute that rescission or a rescis-
sionary measure of damages may sometimes be appropriate 
under § 10(b), nor do they dispute that in this case a 
rescissionary recovery is appropriate on petitioners' § 10(b) 
claims as well as on their § 12(2) claims. Instead, they con-
tend that § 28(a) strictly limits any such rescissionary recov-
ery to the plaintiff's net economic harm. We shall therefore 
assume arguendo that a rescissionary recovery may some-
times be proper on a § 10(b) claim, and that this is such a 
case. 
In enacting § 28(a), Congress did not specify what was 
meant by "actual damages." It is appropriate, therefore, to 
look to "the state of the law at the time the legislation was 
enacted," for guidance in defining the scope of this limitation. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith v. Curran, 456 
U. S. 353, 378 (1982). When § 28(a) was enacted § 12(2) 
stood as a conspicuous example of a rescissionary remedy, 
and we have found that Congress did not intend that a re-
covery in rescission under § 12(2) be reduced by tax benefits 
received. Accordingly, we think § 28(a) should not be read 
to compel a different result where rescissionary damages are 
obtained under § 10(b). 
Even apart from the analogy furnished by § 12(2), this 
Court has never interpreted § 28(a) as imposing a rigid re-
quirement that every recovery on an express or implied right 
of action under the 1934 Act must be limited to the net eco-
nomic harm suffered by the plaintiff. To be sure, this Court 
has noted that "Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act . . . limits recov-
ery in any private damages action brought under the 1934 
Act to 'actual damages,"' Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 734 (1975), and Affiliated Ute Citizens 
clearly interpreted § 28(a) as governing the measures of dam-
ages that are permissible under §10(b). 406 U.S., at 155. 
But the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens also indicated that 
85-519--0PINION 
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"where the defendant received more than the seller's actual 
loss ... damages are the amount of the defendant's profit." 
406 U. S., at 155. This alternative standard aims at pre-
venting the unjust enrichment of a fraudulent buyer, and it 
clearly does more than simply make the plaintiff whole for 
the economic loss proximately caused by the buyer's fraud. 
Indeed, the accepted rationale underlying this alternative is. 
simply that "[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded 
party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent 
party keep them." Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F. 2d 781, 786 
(CAl), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 879 (1965). See also Falk v. 
Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N. E. 243 (1922) (Cardozo, J.). 
Thus, the mere fact that the receipt of tax benefits, plus a full 
recovery under a rescissionary measure of damages, may 
place a§ lO(b) plaintiff in a better position than he would have 
been in absent the fraud, does not establish that the flexible 
limits of § 28(a) have been exceeded. 
In any case, respondents' contention that plaintiffs will re-
ceive undeserved "windfalls" absent an offset for tax benefits 
is greatly overstated. Even if tax benefits could properly be 
characterized as a windfall-which we doubt-the tax laws 
will serve to reduce, although not necessarily to eliminate, 
the extent of plaintiffs' net economic gain as compared to the 
status quo ante. We are told that the "tax benefit rule" will 
apply in cases of rescission, thus making the recovery taxable 
as ordinary income. See Hillsboro National Bank v. Com-
missioner, 460 U. S. 370 (1983); Brief for the United States 
and the SEC 25. Any residual gains to plaintiffs thus 
emerge more as a function of the operation of the Internal 
Revenue Code's complex provisions than of an unduly gener-
ous damages standard for defrauded investors. 
Respondents also overlook the fact that Congress' aim in 
enacting the 1934 Act was not confined solely to compensat-
ing defrauded investors. Congress intended to deter fraud 
and manipulative practices in the securities markets, and to 
ensure full disclosure of information material to investment 
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decisions. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U. S., at 151; see also 
Herman & MacLean, 459 U. S., at 386-387. This deterrent 
purpose is ill-served by a too rigid insistence on limiting 
plaintiffs to recovery of their "net economic loss." Salcer, 
744 F. 2d, at 940. The effect of allowing a tax benefit offset 
would often be substantially to insulate those who commit se-
curities frauds from any appreciable liability to defrauded in-
vestors. The resulting diminution in the incentives for tax 
shelter promoters to comply with the federal securities laws 
would seriously impair the deterrent value of private rights 
of action, which, we have emphasized, "provide 'a most effec-
tive weapon in the enforcement' of the securities laws and are 
a 'necessary supplement to Commission action.'" Bateman 
Eichler, Hill Richards Inc. v. Berner,-- U. S. --, --
(1985) (quoting J . I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432 
(1964)). 
The Court of Appeals' elaborate method for calculating 
damages and interest so as to offset tax benefits supplies an 
additional reason for rejecting its tax benefit offset rule. We 
need not inquire whether evidence concerning tax benefits is 
ordinarily so speculative as to be beyond the jury's province. 
Cf. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U. S. 490 
(1980). It is enough that there are formidable difficulties in 
predicting the ultimate treatment of the investor's claimed 
tax benefits, whether or not an audit has commenced, and 
that the burdens associated with reconstruction of the inves-
tor's tax history for purposes of calculating interest are 
substantial. We think that § 28(a) cannot fairly be read to 
require such a full-scale inquiry into a defrauded investor's 
dealings with the tax collector lest the investor escape with 
anything more than his "net economic loss." 
Respondents' sole remaining contention is that a rule re-
quiring the offset of tax benefits is required in view of "the 
economic reality of tax benefits produced by tax shelters." 
Brief for Respondents 14. They maintain that since "tax 
benefits to the partner represent an important tangible eco-
85-519---0PINION 
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nomic advantage expected to be derived from his invest-
ment," Salcer, 744 F. 2d, at 940, Congress must have in-
tended that tax benefits would reduce the plaintiff's allowable 
recovery under § 28(a). In support of their version of "eco-
nomic reality," respondents note that the return from a tax 
shelter investment may be analyzed as consisting of "cash 
flow, tax benefits and appreciation equity value," R. Haft & 
P. Fass, 4 Tax Sheltered Investments, Intro. 8-9 (3rd ed. 
1981), and that some courts have held that investors may sue 
for fraud where a tax shelter investment has not produced 
promised tax benefits. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 
649 F. 2d 175 (CA3 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 938 (1982). 
We have already established that Congress did not design 
§ 12(2) to accomodate these arguments, and that § 28(a) does 
not place them on a surer footing. Respondents essentially 
ask us to treat tax benefits as a separate asset that is ac-
quired when a limited partner purchases a share in a tax shel-
ter partnership. But the legal form of the transaction does 
not reflect this treatment. Petitioners purchased securities, 
thereby acquiring freely alienable rights to any income that 
accrued to them by virtue of their ownership. They did not, 
however, also acquire a separate, freely transferable bundle 
of tax losses that would have value apart from petitioners' 
status as partners. For obvious reasons, tax deductions and 
tax credits are not, in the absence of a statutory provision to 
the contrary, freely transferable from one person to another 
if wholly severed from the property or activity to which they 
relate: "[t]he statutes pertaining to the determination of tax-
able income ... disclos[e] a general purpose to confine al-
lowable losses to the taxpayer sustaining them, i. e., to treat 
them as personal to him and not transferable to or usable by 
another." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
435, 440 (1934). Accordingly, we decline to treat these tax 
losses as so much property created by the promoters of the 
partnership. It is for Congress, not this Court, to decide 
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whether the federal securities laws should be modified to 
comport with respondents' version of economic reality. 
We acknowledge that, absent an offset for tax benefits, 
plaintiffs may have an incentive to wait to raise their § 12(2) 
claims until they have received the bulk of the tax benefits 
available from a tax shelter, since after their securities are ( 
tendered they will cease to receive tax benefits. We are not 
persuaded, however, that courts lack adequate means to deal 
with any potential for abuse on this score. In cases under 
§ 10(b), some courts have barred plaintiffs from electing re-
scission, or a rescissionary measure of damages, where they 
delayed tender or suit in order to increase their expected re-
covery should the market decline. See, e. g., Baumel v. 
Rosen, 412 F. 2d 571, 574-575 (CA4 1969); Loss, supra, at 
1133, n. 127; Thompson, supra, at 369-370. A similar rule 
may well be appropriate where plaintiffs delay tender or suit 
in order to obtain additional tax benefits, although we need 
not so decide today. 
We also have no occasion in this case to decide whether, 
assuming that a rescissionary recovery may sometimes be 
proper under§ 10(b), plaintiffs in such cases should invariably 
be free to elect a rescissionary measure of damages rather I 
than out-of-pocket damages. Consequently, we do not con-
sider whether courts may ever refuse to allow a rescissionary 
recovery under§ 10(b) where the "premium" for expected tax 
benefits represented a large portion of the purchase price, in 
which event the out-of-pocket measure might yield a signifi-
cantly smaller recovery. See Salcer, 744 F. 2d, at 940, and 
n. 5. In this case, a rescissionary measure of damages was 
determined to be proper, and respondents have abandoned 
their intitial challenge to that ruling. I 
We conclude, then, that the Court of Appeals erred in hold-
ing that § 28(a) requires a rescissionary recovery under 
§ 12(2) or § 10(b) to be reduced by tax benefits received from 




case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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WILLIAM C. RANDALL, et al. 
(Drs. in unsuccessful tax 
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v. 
B.J. LOFTSGAARDEN, et al. (in-
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./1 .;.., w t o./'t:{ {;,. '' J\ U ~:)T l"' 1[ n 
, 1 VV"' ~ ___.,._ 
Cert to CAB 
(per curiam) (Heaney cone. & 
diss.) (Lay diss. + 1) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: This petition presents the same issue as 
No. 85-377, Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture and No. 84-1447, ~er 
v. Envicon Equities Corp., on the discuss list for November 1 (Do 
"---~ 
favorable tax consequences to a defrauded investor offset 
"~USTlN 1['' "\\-\•~ . 
'~. ( 
rescissionary damages awarded under federal securities laws?). 
Petrs also challenge the Eight Circuit 1 s holding that favorable 
tax consequences must be deducted from the consideration paid 
when the investors 1 purchase of the shelter is rescinded when 
calculating damages under Section 12(2). 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petrs invested over 
$152,000 in resps 1 limited partnership that was to construct and 
operate a Ramada Inn and offer tax benefits to petrs. The Ramada 
opened several months behind schedule and substantially over 
cost. The hotel incurred large operating losses, and resps asked 
petrs to extend several large loans to prevent insolvency. An 
audit revealed several frauds. Efforts at resuscitation after a 
purge of management failed, despite the infusion of additional 
capital. 
Petrs sought recovery under Section 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. S 77~(2). That section provides in 
pertinent part: 
"Any person who--
(2) offers or sells a security [through the mails 
and by misstating or omitting a material fact], 
shall be liable to the person purchasing such 
security from him, who may sue either at law 
or in equity in any court of competent 
juridiction, to recover the consideration 
paid for such security with interest thereon, 
less the amount of any income received there-
on, upon the tender of such security, or for 
damages if he no longer owns the security." 
A jury found resps guilty of several violations of secu-
rities laws. The Eight Circuit affirmed the findings of liabil-
i ty, but vacated the award of damages and remanded to the dis-
trict court in a holding similar to th9se of Salcer and Freschi. 
Alstin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 16S (CAS 19S2) (Austin I). 
On remand, the district cou r t deducted plaintiffs' tax 
benefits from their damage awards. On appeal, a panel of the 
Eighth Circuit sua sponte issued an order setting two issues for 
en bane consideration: Whether tax benefits should offset dam-
ages; and how any offset was to be applied in calculations. 
The Eighth Circuit en bane held that Section 12 ( 2) of 
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. S 77~(2) implicitly incor-
porated an "actual damages n principle. 
76S F.2d 949, 954 (CAS 19S5) (en bane) 
Austin v. Loftsqaarden, 
(Austin II). The court 
relied on the "actual damages" language in Section 2S(a) of the 
1934 Act. Courts have construed the recission and restitution 
~ remedy provided by Section 12(2) as substantially equivalent to 
the damages permitted under Section 28(a). Id. Because the goal 
of recission under Section 12(2) is to return the parties to the 
status quo ante, "a plaintiff can recover no more than his or her 
'net ecomonic loss.'" Id. 
On the second issue for en bane consideration, the court 
recomputed damages to allow for interest only on the amount of 
money that each plaintiff was out-of-pocket during each year of 
the investment, rather than granting interest on the total amount 
of consideration paid by each plaintiff from the date paid until 
the date of judgment. The court also held that damages were to 
be doubled so that plaintiffs, who were in the fifty percent 
bracket, could be made whole. 
An additional opinion by the panel (Lay, Ross & Millian) 
performed mop-up on details of the litigation that are not before 
this Court. 
Judges Lay and Bright dissented from the en bane hold-
ing. They argued that the majority erred in determining that tax 
benefits were "income received" in computing recissionary damages 
because tax benefits are not really a reduction in income tax, 
but a deferral of taxes. The benefit to the investor of these 
deferrals depends on the ultimate date of reckoning and the in-
vestor •s income tax bracket in future years. The dissent also 
argued that reduction of damages for tax benfits allowed the resp 
to retain profits he obtained from the defrauded investors. Fi-
nally, the dissent disagreed with the doubling of the award to 
make plaintiffs whole: The statute requires the court to retore 
the consideration paid to the defrauded investor, with interest, 
less any income actually received from the investment." Id. at 
963. 
Judge Heaney also dissented, arguing that the en bane 
court should not have overruled its now-inconsistent holding in 
Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423 (CAS 1984), an action similar to 
this one, but based on Minnesota securities laws. [That issue is 
Circuit housekeeping and is not before this Court.] 
3. CONTENTIONS: This petition in part elaborates upon 
the arguments made in Salcer and Freschi. Because the Eighth 
Circuit relied extensively on statutes as well as on the policy 
considerations raised by the Second Circuit, however, this peti-
tion has focused in more tightly on the statutory underpinnings 
of this offset rule. Petr contends that under section 12 (2), 
courts are commanded to reduce damages only by "income received" 
from the fraudulently sold securities. The Eighth Circuit's in-
terpretation stretches "income" beyond the commonly accepted def-
initions of the term. Moreover, under the terms of the statute, 
plaintiffs are to be awarded "consideration with interest there-
on." The Eighth Circuit's more restrictive award of interest 
only on the amounts they were out-of-pocket at any given time is 
inconsistent with this language. 
Petr also contends that the Eighth Circuit's reliance on 
the "actual damages" language of section 28(a) is misplaced, and 
the phrase must be read with the provision as a whole. Section 
28(a) was to prevent a plaintiff from recovering more than once 
if he pursues both federal and state causes of action. 
Petr also points out that the result in this cases is 
inconsistent with the collateral source rule, under which pay-
ments or benefits from another party are not credited against the 
tortfeasor 's liability, although they cover all or part of the 
harm for which the tortfeasor is liable. The Eighth Circuit held 
that the tax benefits did not fall within the scope of the col-
lateral source doctrine because they emanated directly from the 
shelter investments: petrs contend that the proper question is 
whether the benefit comes from respondents. 
Finally, petr makes arguments similar to those in the 
petitions for Salcer and Freschi: (1) "Actual damages" should be 
interpreted in the same way that the phrase has been interpreted 
in federal copyright and trademark statutes; (2) The credit for 
tax benefits against resps' damages lessen the judgment resp will 
' . 
have to pay and thereby diminishes an incentive against securi-
ties fraud. 
4. DISCUSSION: This case is the best of the three for 
the resolution of the issue of whether tax benefits should offset 
damages in a recissionary action under federal securities laws. 
The discussions in both Second Circuit panels are less complete 
than in this en bane opinion. While the Second Circuit concen-
trated on motivations for tax shelters and investors' goals in 
those ventures, the Eighth Circuit concentrated on the language 
of the statute. Austin II discussed not only the "actual dam-
ages" rationale for the holding, but went on to rest their hold-
ing squarely on the language of the statute by determining 
whether the tax benefits consituted "income received" within the 
meaning of section 12(2). 
Austin II also has more complete discussions of the "Tax 
Benefit Rule" and the collateral sources rule (Austin II uses 
Salcer as a starting point for both discussions). Moreover, be-
cause Austin II is proceeded farther than the Second Circuit 
cases, it reaches issues inherent in the question before this 
Court, but which were not presented to the Second Circuit: are 
tax benefits a return of consideration under 12(2)? does prejudg-
ment interest apply to consideration paid or to out-of-pocket 
money? and should the courts take tax consequences into account. 
This case would allow the Court to reach these intertwined is-
sues. 
I . 
Finally, Austin II makes the ~learest and cleanest pres-
entation of the issues. The Austin litigation went through two 
trials --one essentially on the defendants' "guilt" and the sec-
ond solely on the measure of damages after remand by Austin I. 
On the appeal from that second trial, the sole questions before 
the en bane court were whether tax benefits should offset 
recissionary damages and how those damages should be calculated. 
offset 
Austin II provides 
issue but also its 
a means of resolving not only the 
unavoidable collateral questions. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend granting cert on Austin II and 
holding Salcer and Freschi. 
There is a response. 
October 30, 1985 Chinnis Opinion in petition 
CCC ll/05/S5 
' ~ )lu POOL MEMO SUPPLEMEN~ 
~ ~o. S5-519, Randall v. Loftsgaarden (AUSTIN II) 
~ No. S5-377, Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture 
No. S4-1447, Salcer v. Envicon Equities 
The views of the Solicitor General have come in. I be-
lieve it makes a convincing case that there is a Circuit split 
and that the three decisions styled above have taken an erroneous 
tack. The SG argues that the greater scope of S5-519,v;andall v.~~ 
Loftsgaarden, makes it the best vehicle to address the question 
r---------
presented. 
1. The SG tracks Mike's analysis in SS-377, Freschi, 
that there is a Circuit split • Any distinctions concern tax 
...-----.----~ 
technical details and are unimportant to this issue. 
2. The SG argues that CA2 and CAS have taken an unduly 
------~--- ·----:.?' 
narrow concept of actual damages. The statutory provision limit-
-----·------ --- -~ 
ing plaintiffs' awards to actual damages was to prevent dual re-
covery. CA2 and CAS go beyond that purpose and allow a defendant 
to keep much of his ill-gotten gain while causing the government 
to foot the damages bill through tax "offsets" to a damage award. 
3. The SG's most telling points are: (1) Making the 
defendant pay the full amount of damages rather than offsetting 
that amount by putative tax savings would further the securities 
laws by making fraud more costly and by increasing the awards to 
private attorney generals; and {2) Plaintiffs do not receive a 
windfall absent the offset of tax benefits because of the tax 
consequences of t~e damage award. Arithmatic and my poor knowl-
edge of tax law confirm the SG's second contention. I also agree 
~
with the first half of (1). 
4. Finally, the SG argues that CA2 and CA8 actually 
shortchange plaintiffs because of some possible tax outcomes. I 
follow the argument here but I don't buy it. The SG is willing 
to argue that the tax code is flexible enough to prevent a wind-
fall to plaintiffs who recover the full measure of damages from a 
defendant [see ~3(2)], but not sufficiently sophisticated to keep 
plaintiffs from having to "pay twice" under CA2 and CA8. Any ) 
failure by the SG here does not affect the overall resolution of 
the case. 
November 5, 1985 Cabell Pool Supplement 
Court ................... . 'Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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No. 85-519, Randall v. Loftsgaarden 
Cert. CA8 Wed., Apr. 2 (2d case) 
Question Presented 
Should the tax benefits from a "fraudulent" tax shelter 
go to an "already-compensated" investor or to the defrauding 
seller? 
I. BACKGROUND 
I confess at the outset that I recommended the Court 
grant on this case because of its importance in the administra-
2 • . 
tion of the securities and tax laws. Al~hough the case is a tri-
fle dry, it offers the opportunity for the Cour~o outline more 
carefully the proper remedies for fraudulent securities sales and 
~ o aid federal securities laws. 
The facts of the case are straightforward. Petr s in-
vested in a motel that was to be both an independent source of 
revenue and a tax shelter, and the motel went under. The purvey-~ 
of the investment, resps, perpetrated several frauds on h-
Despi te the failure of the otel, petrs di..Q receive the~ 
ors 
petrs. 
anticipated tax benefits. fJ~I-v. 
~in federal court under a variety of legal ~ 
fl.(;-H 
theories, and the jury found that resps had violated, inter alia, 
§10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and §12 ( 2) of the 
1"1-
~ 
Securities Act of 1933. Under the 1933 Act, §12(2) limits a ~ 
plaintiff's recovery to purchase price of the security - with~~~ 
interest - less the amount of any income received from the secu-
rity. Similarly, under the 1934 Act, §28(a) limits recovery 
under a 10 (b) action to "actual damages on account of the act 
complained of." 
• 
CA8 affirmed the findings of liability, but remanded so CIJ .? 6 
that the District Court could "allow proof of any economic ben~ 
fits received by plaintiffs on account of the investment" and J 
"instruct the jury that the damage award must be reduced by any 
value shown to have been received by the plaintiffs." 
v"' 
The District Court did so. Petrs appealed to the CA8, 
and the court In an opinion that is at times 
contradictory, that under both the 1933 and 1934 ~ 
3. 
Acts, the plaintiffs' recoveries were ,limited to "actual dam-
ages." CA8 started with the proposition that although §12(2) 
does not incorporate the words "actual damages," it should be 
read to include an "actual damages principle" because ( i) the 
section's language describes the same mathematics used to calcu-
t.iA) 
late "actual damages"; and '-( 2) the 1933 act should be read in 
pari materia with the 1934 act, which does contain the phrase 
"actual damages." 
CAS then reasoned that "actual damages" - particularly-e.:~ 
in the context of a recission action - mandated that a plaintiff 
~ 
could recover no more than his 'net economic loss,' because the fD ~~ 
goal of §12 (2) [and presumably §10 (b)] is to return the partie~
 
to their positions before the deal was ever undertaken. 
Petrs made several attempts to do an end-run around the 
actual damages principle that CA8 had established. Petrs argued: 
1. Tax savings are neither "income" nor "received" 
within the meaning of §12(2). 
2. The tax benefit rule would undo the earlier tax 
savings so that at the end of the day petrs would 
have neither a judicial recovery nor a tax shelter. 
3. The tax benefits should not be included under the 
"collateral source rule." 
4. The ruling unjustly enriched resps by sparing them 
liability in the amount of the shelter's tax sav-
ings. 
5. The ruling deprived the Government of just tax rev-
enues. 
Although these efforts were unsuccessful, it is neces-
sary to detail their failure because petrs assert them again be-
fore this curt. 
1. CA8 determined that although tax savings are not 
income in an accounting sense, · they are "value re-
ceived" that must be taken into account in deter-
mining the extent of damages. CA8 also held thab 





"stipulated that they have received permanent tax 
benefits," and the IRS took all possible recapture 
when the hotel was foreclosed in 1978. Pet. for 
Cert. All. 
The court also found the tax benefit rule inappo-
site, because that rule provides only that a tax-
payer who claims a deduction resulting in a tax 
benefit one year and who later obtains a recovery 
or repayment in a later year must include the re-
cover as ordinary income. 
'' \\ The collateral source doctrine - e.g., benefits 
from insurance are not deducted from tort damages -
was inapplicable because the tax benefits were not 
a collateral source: although paid by a third party 
(the government), they emanated directly from the 
tax shelter sought by the petrs. 
The resps were not "enriched" because they had not 
"'retained' any of [petrs'] consideration" and the 
purpose of the securities laws "is not to penalize 
defendants, but to compensate plaintiffs for any 
actual monetary loss." Id., at Al3. 
The court rejected the revenue reduction argument 
because "the government is entitled only to those 
revenues which are authorized under the tax laws." 
Ibid. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Remedies based on recission, which possibly include ..........----. 
§28 (a) and §12 (2), allow a plaintiff to unwind the transaction 
and recover his purchase price. -But where the purchased proper-
ty, even though fraudulently sold, has produced economic bene-
fits, it is unclear under §28{a) and §12(2) whether this value 
should remain with the buyer or go the defrauding seller (through 
"offset of damages"). 
The Court of Appeals has determined that resps, who en-
gaged in fraudulent conduct, must do no more than simply return 
to the plaintiff the original consideration. This holding is 
logical and defensible when viewed from the perspective of 
recission, but courts construing §28{a) and §12{2) have also used 
"unjust enrichment" principles to allocate security's economic 
benefits to the defrauded buyer. Moreover, CAS's exclusive focus 
on recission as a measure for damages has several perverse ef-
fects. A defendant who has committed fraud is in a better posi-
tion than a party who has only breached a contract {who must pay 
a plaintiff what he might have gained) • Fraud is therefore de--------terred less than breach of contract. It also lessens incentives 
for bringing private fraud actions. 
A. The Statutory Language 
Petrs focus on the language of §28{a) and §12{2). Petrs 
contend that under the bulk of securities cases, §12{2) 's phrase 
"income" has never been interpreted to include tax benefits, and 
there is no statutory language on which a rule "applicable only 
to 'tax shelters'" can rest. Petrs further argue that §28{a) 's 
"actual damages" provision appears only in the context of autho-
rizing parallel state and federal remedies, and it was designed 
only to prevent duplicative recoveries when a plaintiff has 
brought claims under both state law and federal securities stat-
utes. See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 {CA2 1981). 
Petrs' arguments on §12 {2) are fairly accurate state-
ments of the law, and I believe that the reading of §28{a) 's "ac-
tual damages" as only preventing double recoveries under state 
and federal law is sensible because of the context of that 
phrase. But petr's statutory arguments certainly do not compel 
reversal of CAS. For example, "income" has never been interpret-
ed to include tax benefits simply because tax shelters have cre-
ated securities fraud litigation only recently. And CAS's read-
ings of "income" and "received" make sense for investments where 
the dominant purpose is tax shelter. ~r""2..t­
~ 
In short, the language itself of §12(2) and §2S(a) of- ~f.r 
If one had ~ 
_____.... 
fers little guidance in the disposition of this case. 
~------~----~ -L/I-Ie 
to chose between petr's statutory reading and CAS's interpret~
tion, petr's is marginally more sensible because the "actual da~-
ages" language of §2S(a) and "actual damages" principle of §12(2) 
was probably intended only to bar double recoveries under state 
and federal law. 
B. The SG's "Common Law of Recission" 
The SG as amicus in support of petr attacks CAS's "plain ---- -language" reading through the "income received" phrase. Tax de-
ductions and tax credits, so the argument runs, are provided by 
the IRS and are not "income received" on a partnership invest-
ment. Under "common-law remedies of recission and restitution," 
the rescinding buyer [petr] had to restore to the seller [resp] 
the property plus its "direct product." SG Brief 7. Therefore, 
"[b]ecause tax deductions and credits are derived from the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, not from the investment property, and because 
they required independent acts of the taxpayer (including genera-
tion of income) before they can come into existence, they are not 
a 'direct product' of the rescinded investment requiring 'resto-
ration' to the fraudulent seller." Id., at 7-8. 
The SG has properly characterized the common law of 
recission and restitution, as shown by some checking fairly far 
afield. It is not convincing, however, to argue that tax bene-
fits are not a direct product of a tax shelter because they "ema-
nate" from the IRS and because they depend on other factors 
(e.g., the investors must have additional income to make these 
write-offs valuable). Tax savings were the dominant purpose of 
the limited partnershi and of the construction itself. The tax 
savings "emanate" from the IRS precisely in the same way oil rev-
enues from a producing wellhead "emanate" from the refinery that 
purchases the crude. Tax savings "depend" on additional income 
roughly in the same way the value of oil varies with market 
forces. The common law doctrine of "direct product" is meant to 
exclude from damages' set-offs income that is independent of the 
purchased property . 
......-------
In a tax shelter, the arguments concerning 
"independence" prove not that the tax benefits are independent of 
the shelter, but rather than those benefits are intermeshed with 
other economic transactions. 
I therefore do not believe that a vote to reverse CA8 
could be grounded safely on the "direct product" doctrine in the 
common-law remedy of recission - a doctrine arguendo grafted on 
the §12(2) and §28(a). 
For the same reasons, I would reject the argument that / 
tax savings are a "collateral source." 
C. Common-Law Remedies for Securities Fraud 
Starting with the proposition that private remedies 
under the federal securities laws supplement, not diminish, com-
mon-law remedies, the SG argues that CA8 's interpretation of 
§12 (2) and §28 (a) "has afforded the perpetrators of securities 
fraud a defense unknown to the common law and thus has given the 
federal remedial provisions an unduly narrow construction." SG 
Brief 15. Under §12(2), so the argument goes, Congress author-
ized a statutory version of the common-law remedies of recission 
and restitution and also meant to liberalizing the common-law 
cause of action. ·Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 
No. 84-679, pp. 8-10 (June 11, 1985). Those pre-existing reme-
dies would not have reduced petrs' awards by the tax benefits so 
neither should §12(2). As for §28(a) -which governs lO(b) dam-
ages - the SG contends that "actual damages" in 1934 meant any 
"nonspeculative, compensatory damages"; the purpose of the phrase 
(e.g., awards under both was only to prevent duplicative awards 
common law and the Securities Acts). ~ 
w-crrl<..~ 
Because I believe that this argument presents the best 
hope of providing a resolution to this case, I have taken the 
of the SG's line of attack. 
and 1934 Securities Acts derive from two separate and independent 
sources at common law. 
~
§12 (2), courts 
on harm to the 
In setting damages under §28(a) and 
~
•• 
ts that focus 
and limit recovery by the principles of _....., 
legal causation. (CA8 used this approach.) In addition, howev----
v 
er, courts have also used principles of unjust enrichment, look-
ing to the defendant's gain, and requiring the defendant to re-
turn all benefits received even if that gain exceeds plaintiff's 
loss. 
Under unjust enrichment, recovery is based on the bene-
fit the defendant received "by reason of an infringement of an-
other person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other." Re-
st~~on §1. A windfall is permissible be-
cause "[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the 
benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep 
them." Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (CAl), cert. denied, 
382 u.s. 879 (1965) (the best-known windfall profits case). This 
preference probably reflects courts' view that the purpose of the \ 
federal securities laws is to both compensate and deter. Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 u.s. 128, 155 (1972). As 
Prof. Loss has explained with respect to one of the provisions: 
"The damages ceiling imposed by 28(a) in terms of 'actual damages 
on account of the action complained of' does not foreclose a 
windfall recovery based on the defendant's benefit rather than 
the plaintiff's loss." Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
1134 (1983). 
It is clear that resps were unjustly enriched within the 
meaning of the doctrine. The tax shelter deal failed because the 
hotel itself was a white elephant as a result of resps' fraud. 
But the promised tax benefits from depreciation and the Invest-
ment Tax Credit still came through. By reducing petrs' damages 
by the amount of these benefits, and thereby reducing the amount 
resps have to pay, CA8 effectively allocated the benefits of the 
tax shelte~o ~~s rather than petrs. ,.... 
D. Computation of Damages 
There is some dispute on the question of computation of 
damages and whether the Code would prevent petrs from receiving a 
real windfall. These questions reduce to complicated and techni-
cal accounting issues. They do not implicate the legal princi-
ples discussed above, unless the "tail wags the dog." I recom-
mend that you make your decision on the issues in parts A-_C, 
without regard to the mechanics of computing damages, because 
those mechanics will vary a great deal among similar cases and 
thus provide no overarching guidance. Moreover, an apparent fac-
tual dispute among the parties as to what tax years are closed 
makes any discussion here problematic as well as unhelpful. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The pla~anguage of §12(2) and §28(a) tips the balance 
~-
versing CA8 because "actual damages" - as both a phrase -and a principle - was meant only to avoid double recovery ~nder 
state and federal law~ -- ---
The SG's argument concerning direct product and collat-
eral source failed to convince me because tax benefits are an 
essential part of a tax shelter. 
Courts have used both "bare bones" recission and "unjust 
enrichment" to compute damages at common law and in Federal secu-
rities actions. I believe CA8 erred in the circumstances of this 
-
case by using only bare bones recission and ignoring a substan-,.,.. . 
tial body of law that allows damage~ to be computed uo.Qer §,28 (a) -and §12(2) on the basis of a defendant's enrichment. ----- - ,__.___.. - ......... 
As between the defrauded buyer and the defrauding sell-
er, I believe that the benefit of this bargain (the tax savings) 
sho~d be allocated t~ the buyer as a matter of federal sec~r i-
---..-- ~ 
ties law, common law securities actions, and common sense. __ _.,_... c:: - _,____..... _______ _ 
I recommend you vote to reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
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